We study the effects of product differentiation in a Stackelberg model with demand uncertainty for the first mover. We do an ex-ante and ex-post analysis of the profits of the leader and of the follower firms in terms of product differentiation and of the demand uncertainty. We show that even with small uncertainty about the demand, the follower firm can achieve greater profits than the leader, if their products are sufficiently differentiated. We also compute the probability of the second firm having higher profit than the leading firm, subsequently showing the advantages and disadvantages of being either the leader or the follower firm.
Introduction
The Stackelberg model [1] is one of the most widely used models in industrial organization to analyse the behaviour of the firms in a competitive environment. It models the strategic situation where firms sequentially choose their output levels in a market. The belief of firstmover advantage was widely held among entrepreneurs and venture capitalists, but is now questioned by numerous practitioners. There are examples of successful and unsuccessful pioneering firms as described, for instance, in Liu [2] : Dell was the first to introduce the direct-sale business model into the PC market, and it achieved great success; however, during the dot-com booming era, Pets.com, Webvan.com, Garden.com and eToys.com were all unsuccessful first movers in their respective market segments. The probability of success of pioneering in a market clearly depends on many factors, including technology, marketing strategy, market demand and product differentiation (see [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] ). Liu [2] studied the effect of uncertainty in demand systems where only the leading firm is facing uncertainty in the demand parameter α that is considered to be uniformly distributed on an interval α0, α1 . In this paper, we add the dimension of product differentiation to Liu's model and we show among other results that if their products are sufficiently differentiated, even with small uncertainty about the demand, the follower can achieve higher profits than the leader.
Our study focus on the influence of two parameters: the product differentiation 0 < γ ≤ 1 and demand uncertainty θ ≥ 1. When γ is close to one we have small = ≤ ∈ { } ≤ differentiation between the goods and when γ is small we have high differentiation between the goods. The demand uncertainty θ α1/α0 can be interpreted as the maximum value of demand using the minimum value of demand α0 as the unit. In Theorem 1, we prove the existence of a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium that requires a different reasoning from Liu's [2] . In Corollary 1, we compare the quantities produced by each firm and prove the existence of a threshold T for α, depending upon θ and γ , such that, bellow that threshold the leader is producing more than the follower and above that threshold the follower is producing more than the leader. In Theorem 2, we present the (ex-ante) expected profits of the two firms, depending upon the parameters θ and γ and we characterize two parameter regions A1 and A2 in the parameter space (γ , θ) with the following properties: in the region A1 the ex-ante profits of firm F1 are higher than ex-ante profits of firm F2; in the region A2 the ex-ante profits of firm F2 are higher than ex-ante profits of firm F1. In Theorem 3, we prove the existence of a threshold θ0 for the demand uncertainty parameter θ , such that for θ greater than θ0 the expected profit of the follower is always (i.e. for any γ ) greater than the expected profit of the leader. In Theorem 4, we find the (ex-post) profits of the firms and we characterize three parameter regions P1, P2 and P3 in the parameter space (γ , θ) corresponding to three distinct economic behaviours: a region P1, where the leading firm always has a higher profit than the follower firm; a region P2, where there exists R, depending upon γ and θ , with the property that (i) if α< R, the leading firm has a higher profit than the follower firm, and (ii) if α > R, the follower firm has a higher profit than the leading firm; autoedited1. a region P3, where there exists L, depending upon γ and θ , with the property that (i) if L < α < R, the leading firm has a higher profit than the follower firm, and (ii) if α < L or α > R, the follower firm has a higher profit than the leading firm. Hence, we show that the leading firm looses its advantage for high values of the demand intercept α, if the demand uncertainty parameter θ belongs to the union of regions P2 and P3. Furthermore, the leading firm also looses its advantage for low values of the demand intercept α, if the demand uncertainty parameter θ belongs to the region P3. Furthermore, in Corollary 2, we compute the ex-ante probability P(π 2 * > π 1 * ) that the follower's ex-post profit is higher than the leader's ex-post profit. ex-ante expected profits and the ex-post profits of the leader firm and of the follower firm, and we also compute the probability P(π 2 * > π 1 * ) of the second firm having higher profit than the leading firm. We show that this probability increases both with the demand uncertainty and the degree of differentiation of the goods.
The model and the perfect Bayesian equilibrium
We start by describing the Stackelberg duopoly with product differentiation. We consider two firms, each producing a differentiated good. The demand, for simplicity, is linear with α > 0 and 0 < γ 1, where pi is the price and qi the amount of good produced by the firm Fi , for i 1, 2 . We note that the two products are substitutes and, since γ 1, 'cross effects' are dominated by 'own effects'. The value of γ expresses the degree of product differentiation. When γ is equal to one, the goods are homogeneous, and when γ tends to zero, we are close to independent goods (see [18] ). We assume that the firms have the same constant marginal cost c. From now on, we consider prices net of marginal
costs. This is without any loss of generality because if the marginal cost is positive, we may replace α by α c. We consider that the demand intercept is a random variable uniformly distributed in the interval α0, α1 , with α1 > α0 > 0. We note that, in this case, the demand uncertainty parameter θ is equal to the ratio α1/α0 (can be interpreted as the maximum value of demand using the minimum value of demand α0 as the unit). The distribution of α is common knowledge. Profit πi of firm Fi is given by
As already stated in the Introduction, the timing of the game is as follows:
(i) Firm F1 chooses a quantity level q1 0 without knowing the value of the demand realization; (ii) Firm F2 first observes the demand realization and observes q1, and then chooses a quantity level q2 ≥ 0.
In Theorem 1 is proved in the Appendix. From this theorem, we conclude that when the interval of α is large and the products are not very differentiated (large γ ), if the realized demand is small the follower may choose not to produce at all. The relevant parameters in terms of their economical effects are γ and θ . In the next corollary, we compare the quantities produced by each firm. Corollary 1 is proved in the Appendix. The three different situations described in this corollary are illustrated for some values of the parameters in Figure 1 . We observe the existence of a threshold R for α such that for values of α smaller than that threshold the leader is producing more, and for values of α greater than that threshold the follower is producing more. This is due to the fact that the leader makes the decision based only on expectations. The follower is going to produce more if the demand turns out to be large (and possibly more than the leader), and less if the realized demand is small (and possibly less than the leader).
Ex-ante expected profits
In this section, we present an ex-ante analysis of the Stackelberg game previously described. In the next theorem, we explicitly show the profits that the firms can expect, before the knowledge of the demand realization α. For simplicity of notation, we denote by π i * the profit πi q 1 * , q 2 * (q 1 * , α) , for i ∈ {1, 2}. Let γ0 : [3, +∞) → R 0 + be defined by 
such that if the uncertainty parameter θ is greater than θ0, then the expected profit of the follower firm is always greater than the expected profit of the leading firm.
Theorem 3 is proved in the Appendix. In Figure 3 , we plot the firms' expected profits, E (π 1 * ) and E (π 2 * ), as functions of the demand uncertainty parameter θ and of the degree γ of product differentiation. Figure 4 illustrates cross-sections of Figure 3 at the degrees γ 0.9 (Figure 4(a) ) and γ 0.5 ( Figure 4(b) ) of product differentiation. Figure 5 illustrates cross-sections of Figure 3 at the demand uncertainty parameter's values θ = 2 ( Figure 5(a) ) and θ = 8 ( Figure 5(b) ). These figures illustrate that both parameters θ and γ are relevant to determine which firm has ex-ante higher expected profits.
Ex-post profits
In this section, we present the ex-post analysis of the same Stackelberg game. In Theorem 4, we explicitly present the ex-post profits π 1 * and π 2 * of firms 1 and 2, respectively, obtained after the observation of the demand realization. We describe three regions for the demand uncertainty parameter θ α1/α0 corresponding to three distinct profits relations between the leading and the follower firms (see Figure 6) . The low-medium uncertainty boundary value is Figure 7 . Plots of the functions Iγ and Jγ , and the regions P 1 , P 2 and P 3 .
The functions Iγ and Jγ characterize the demand uncertainty parameter θ for which the leading firm looses its advantage for some realizations of the demand random variable. In fact, in the next theorem, we will show that the leading firm looses its advantage for high values of the demand intercept, if the demand uncertainty parameter θ is greater than Iγ , and also for low values of the demand intercept, if the demand uncertainty parameter θ is greater than Jγ . Hence, for high values of the demand uncertainty parameter (θ > Jγ ) only in an intermediate zone of the realized demand does the first mover preserve its advantage. We observe that for homogeneous goods (γ 1), the functions Iγ and Jγ coincide, i.e. I1 J1 (Liu's case [2] ), and for non-homogeneous goods (0 γ < 1), we have that Iγ < Jγ . Observe that the curve given by E (π 1 * ) E (π 2 * ) crosses the curves P1 and P2 (see Figure 7) .
We define L and R as follows: Theorem 4 is proved in the Appendix. This theorem allows us to say that even with small uncertainty about the demand, the follower can achieve greater profits than the leader, if their products are sufficiently differentiated (Figure 8 ). In Figure 9 , we present the plots of R and L as functions of the demand uncertainty parameter θ and of the degree of differentiation γ . In Figure 10 , we show the plots of R and L as functions of the demand uncertainty parameter θ , for some chosen values of the degree γ of differentiation. We take α0 = 1 and, so, we observe that α1 = θ . We note that the values L and R are increasing with θ . Figure 11 . The probability of the second firm having higher profit than the leading firm, as a function of the demand uncertainty parameter θ , for different degrees γ of the differentiation of the goods, by taking α 0 = 1. Figure 12 . Solid line refers to the equality between the probabilities of the second firm having higher profit than the leading firm and the dashed line refers to the equality between the expected profits of both firms.
We observe that 
